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COOPERATIVE SURPLUS: THE EFFICIENCY
JUSTIFICATION FOR ACTIVE GOVERNMENT
CHARLES H. KoCH, JR.*
In his paper here and in several other recent works, Professor
Epstein has argued for strong constitutional protection for eco-
nomic liberties. Economic liberties are as important to him as
other liberties protected by the Constitution and, as discussed in
his paper, implicate those other liberties.1 Government infringe-
ment on economic liberties may infringe also on fundamental free-
doms, here religious freedoms.
I find that Epstein's zeal for economic freedom ignores the very
purpose of our joining together into a cooperative society. We, as a
people, entered into what eighteenth century political philosophers
called the "social contract"; or, more realistically, each of us ac-
cedes to being governed, if we have any sense, because joining a
society creates a "cooperative surplus" from which we all may ben-
efit.2 A necessary condition for gaining that surplus is that we re-
linquish some individual freedom. Both economic and
noneconomic freedoms are implicated, but accepting restraints on
economic freedom may pay larger dividends for society and the
individual.
We must recognize at the outset that one cannot attack Ep-
stein's zealous defense of economic liberties for improper motives.
Any survey of his publications, or personal conversations for that
matter, establish impeccably humane motives behind his view. For
him, protection of economic liberties, as with other liberties, ex-
pands the value of our society for all classes or groups. Infringe-
ment of those liberties as well as others on behalf of a current ex-
* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary. B.A., University of Maryland, 1966; J.D., George Washington University,
1969; LL.M., The University of Chicago, 1975.
1. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, passim
(1990).
2. See generally T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (E.P. Dutton & Co. ed. 1950); J. LOCKE, THE SEC-
OND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (J.W. Gough 3d ed. 1976).
3. See supra note 2.
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pedience harms everyone, even when the social goals of such action
are ones with which he would agree.
In short, Epstein advocates the social value of the economist's
sense of efficiency. Efficiency makes the pie bigger and we all po-
tentially benefit. President Kennedy offered a more folksy expres-
sion of the same principle: A rising tide raises all boats. Even Marx
recognized that capitalist efficiency increases wealth throughout
the various classes.4 Thus a commitment to this sense of efficiency
is a commitment to improving the position of all economic groups.
Economists, in general, caution against short run expediencies
that adversely affect efficiency. Nonetheless, even a fairly strong
market economist might accept government intervention that reg-
ulates "externalities." "Externalities" are costs or benefits accruing
to those outside the transaction and hence not included in the
"price" of the good.5
Economists might approach the justification for confining funda-
mental liberties, such as religion, in the same way as economic lib-
erties. As Posner expressed it: "Government may not regulate
these [first amendment] markets beyond what is necessary to cor-
rect externalities and other impediments to the efficient allocation
of resources."' The exercise of religious liberties, for example, may
adversely affect others. For example, the noise of a church bell
early Sunday morning may annoy late risers. For those who enjoy
the sound, the church has bestowed positive externalities. Yet Pos-
ner is referring to the regulation of negative externalities. In the
case of the church bell, the negative externalities are de minimis. If
these externalities are too great, however, such as with human sac-
rifice, we feel we can regulate even religion.
Epstein would, I think, find even this'motivation for active gov-
ernment suspect. He would contend that, although this seems
sound in theory, we often make the judgment to regulate poorly.
Hence, in our attempts to constrain the negative aspects of the ex-
ercise of a freedom, we in fact diminish the aggregate value of that
4. R. WOLFF & S. RESNICK, ECONOMICS: MARXIAN VERSUS NEOCLASSICAL 128-29 (1987). Of
course, he also contended that as this greater wealth was spread to the working class it
became a means of increasing exploitation. For him, a more equal, but "poorer" society, is
more just. Id. at 183.
5. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (3d ed. 1986).
6. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 Am. EcoN. REV. 1, 12 (1987).
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freedom. In questioning our ability to regulate all liberties, he sug-
gests that we have the same problem evaluating the effects of ex-
ternalities when we are controlling economic liberties as we do with
respect to first amendment liberties. Government manipulation di-
minishes our aggregate economic welfare, and probably results in a
uniform lessening of all welfare, including our spiritual, political or
social welfare.7
On the other hand, the argument for active government has
strong moral and humane overtones. Government action that af-
fects economic liberties works "transfers," either indirectly by reg-
ulation or directly by welfare benefits. In economics, a "transfer" is
a redistribution of wealth that has no productive purpose.' In con-
trast, an exchange that moves goods to the highest valued user is
distributionally efficient and increases aggregate wealth. 9 A pro-
ductive exchange motivates productive activity and is efficient. A
transfer, however, merely moves wealth around with no benefit to
society and with significant potential to actually diminish aggre-
gate wealth.10
The purpose of government-compelled transfers is the move-
ment of wealth from advantaged segments of society to disadvan-
taged ones. In addition to the humanitarian justification for such
transfers, one can advance an efficiency sounding argument: The
transfers do not increase aggregate wealth, but they do increase
aggregate utility. Assuming a diminishing marginal utility of
money,1 a transfer to one with less money will make that money
"worth" more in the hands of the disadvantaged. For example, if
government takes $25,000 from a millionaire and uses it to provide
food and housing for five people, the value of the food and housing
is greater than the value of the second BMW the millionaire would
have purchased with that money.
7. Today, the relative state of planned economies versus free market economies and the
people served by those economies provides impressive evidence supporting economic
freedom.
8. See R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 7.
9. Id. at 10-12.
10. A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMIcS 7 (1st ed. 1989).
11. This is a debatable proposition. Rich people may in fact value money more than poor
people.
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Again, Epstein would doubt the government's ability to under-
take these transfers in a way that would in fact increase even util-
ity. Political considerations are likely to distort our judgments on
these transfers. Perhaps more importantly, the administrative
costs of transfer programs divert wealth to politicians and bureau-
crats in a way that diminishes society's aggregate wealth so much
that utility cannot be increased sufficiently to compensate for
these losses.
These arguments against active government are strong and cau-
tion against precipitous government interference in natural market
processes. Depending on one's findings as to the costs and benefits
of each government program, one may take several positions on the
advisability of active government. One may even take Epstein's ex-
treme position without appearing insensitive to human values.
However, these arguments about the advisability of active govern-
ment are not relevant to the question of whether government
should be constitutionally prohibited from engaging in such
activities.
No matter how sympathetic one is to the pragmatic arguments
against active government, it is difficult to accept what I see as
Epstein's working principle that any government-compelled trans-
fer is an unconstitutional taking of what Locke called "the product
of our labor" in violation of the social contract represented by the
Constitution. 2 The phrase "product of our labor" connotes our ba-
sic entitlement from participating in the economy-that property
we earned and hence most surely deserve to hold. Epstein is justifi-
ably concerned that government takings from the product of our
labor diminish the social benefits envisioned by the Constitution.
In order to raise these arguments to a constitutional dimension,
however, one must demonstrate that government infringements on
economic liberties are fundamentally detrimental to our basic con-
cept of society. My view is that not only is this not the case, but
that some infringements on economic freedom are in fact funda-
mental to joining together as a society. This analysis hinges on
what economists call "cooperative surplus."
Resort to the "prisoners' dilemma" game can help explain this
theory. As you may know, if the two prisoners cooperate between
12. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 388-96.
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themselves in this game both will be better off. Together they will
serve much less jail time, which is the cooperative surplus. Corre-
spondingly, absent cooperation, the prisoners will be better off if
an authority forces cooperation. Indeed, they would be better off
paying some of their surplus to a third party who forces them to
cooperate. To a large extent, that is the efficiency justification for
government: It forces cooperation and creates cooperative sur-
plus.' 3 Understanding that government intervention creates sur-
plus by limiting individual conduct is the beginning of an efficiency
justification for an active government and the reason, I believe,
strict enforcement of limitations based on economic liberties has
not emerged in our constitutional law.
Let me explain by way of an example. Suppose that I work as a
lawyer and am willing to do all the work I can for $100,000 per
year. Suppose, however, that my clients are willing to pay me
$150,000 per year. We each have a "threat value," or point at
which we are willing to walk away from the deal: for me, less than
$100,000 and for my clients, more than $150,000. So long as we
bargain within that range, however, we will act efficiently. Econom-
ics, so far as I know, has no disciplined way of allocating the sur-
plus and often, for theoretical purposes, assumes that the surplus
will be divided equally. In reality, the surplus is divided according
to such things as bargaining power. 4
Assuming for now that the value of a surplus can be determined,
if a third party takes the surplus, or part of the surplus, there is no
efficiency loss. Say, for example, that a third party charges a fee for
providing a site for the bargain. If the fee is less than the surplus,
13. Professor Epstein recognized this point. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 8 (1985). His only quarrel with the cooperative surplus
theory is that the state expropriates the surplus. This is not a problem, however, if the state
uses the surplus to serve the people or to generate more surplus. His dissatisfaction, then, is
with the political process that allocates the surplus, not with the active government that
created the surplus.
14. An efficiency reason for allowing bargaining exists, however. The bargaining process
communicates each side's value, and there is rarely a better way of finding that value. We
know, and do not even need to assume, that if the deal takes place, it takes place within the
bargaining space and it allocates surplus. The bargain is distributionally efficient because
the deal shifts the resource to a higher valuing user. Often missed is the fact that the deal
brings about productive efficiency as well. Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 263,
270-77 (1986). We know much less if the deal does not go through.
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then the efficient bargain will still take place; the allocation of sur-
plus between the parties will simply be smaller.
Suppose the third party is the government. At the first level, the
government's taking of surplus is at worst efficiency neutral. If the
government takes only the surplus, it has not created an ineffi-
ciency. Only when the government takes more than the cooperative
surplus does it create an inefficiency. This cautions temperance
and a limited concept of government intervention, but does not re-
quire absolute prohibition by making such action unconstitutional.
So long as active government affects only surplus, under whatever
justification,15 one cannot challenge such activity on efficiency
grounds."6
As Epstein suggests, the philosophical underpinning of the Con-
stitution's efficiency aspects are rooted in eighteenth century "so-
cial contract" theory.'1 If you will remember my original example
concerning the economics of a bargain, you will recall that the
third party may gain some of the surplus because the third party
creates the conditions that lead to the surplus. The social contract
works much the same way.
We come together and allow others to govern us because we gain
a cooperative surplus from doing so. We are rational maximizers at
least in the limited sense that we will not intentionally hurt our-
selves. Hence, we never accept government action that diminishes
total wealth. Rather, we enter the contract to increase our total
wealth by creating a cooperative surplus. Less theoretically, each of
us in modern society accepts the contract and its constraints on
individual liberty because we seek to participate in surplus-gener-
ating community action.
Evidence abounds that modern individuals accept limits on per-
sonal behavior in order to participate in activities having joint ben-
15. Justification for active government may include protection of the bargaining process
or enforcement of the bargain.
16. An economist finds it relatively easy to talk about this surplus as more than mere
money. The cost for an economist is the "opportunity cost" or what you must give up to get
what you want. If what you give up is worth more to you than what you want, you will not
do it. The value of anything for an economist is not its dollar value.
17. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 9-18.
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efit.18 This behavior is found even in an environment of competi-
tive self-interest. For example, competing businesses join into
cartels and agree to enforced cooperation. Indeed, antitrust laws
attack this cooperation by attacking the enforcement devices.
Just as these cartels are a burden on other segments of an econ-
omy, enforced cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma interferes
with law enforcement and hence is detrimental to society. Cooper-
ation is not per se beneficial. Yet just because cooperation may
have both a good and a bad impact on society is no justification for
eliminating cooperation-seeking government activity altogether by
constitutional prohibitions. The Constitution contemplates instead
that we can trust the democratic process to search for cooperative
activities that will benefit society. The fact that active government
does not always achieve this result does not justify eliminating all
such activity.
The cooperative surplus motivation for accepting the social con-
tract, our voluntary participation in society, does, however, suggest
a concept of economic liberties. Remember that economists may
accept constraints on freedom that protect others from the exter-
nal cost of our exercise of that freedom. The concept of cooperative
surplus suggests another approach to the constitutional dimensions
of economic liberties: The Constitution limits the government to
actions that take the surplus its own enforced cooperation created.
Epstein suggests that the Constitution was intended to protect
the product of our labor as defined by Locke."' Locke's influence
on the drafters surely supports this view. However, the concept of
cooperative surplus suggests that government action may be taking
back only the surplus it created. If so, it is not affecting the prod-
uct of our individual labor, but-acquiring and allocating the prod-
uct of our joint participation in society. So long as the government
action affects only surplus, constitutional limitations on those ac-
tions are without support.
A boundary may exist at this point between a moderate view of
economic liberties and a more politically liberal one. Under a more
18. The value of cooperation is so great that even unilateral cooperation may optimize a
participant's position if others are convinced thereby to cooperate also. Allman, Nice Guys
Finish First, SCMENCE, Oct. 1984, at 24.
19. See Epstein, supra note 1.
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liberal view of economic liberties, the Constitution might permit
government action reaching even beyond the surplus. This view
would find constitutionally permissible the taking of the product of
our labor, our earned entitlement, for some social purposes. We
may justify this broader government intervention because it is
aimed at enhancing the cooperative surplus in the future. The gov-
ernment, in essence, takes in order to invest in the future. An even
more liberal view might allow such taking on moral grounds alone.
Whenever the government reaches beyond the cooperative sur-
plus, however, it jeopardizes efficiency values. If one believes that
the Constitution protects efficiency values in some way, one would
find a constitutional objection to such government action. None-
theless, to say that such government action is unwise is easier than
saying that it violates some fundamental principle incorporated in
the Constitution.
The 50-year-old constitutional law that Epstein finds disagree-
able does not define economic liberties so as to protect against gov-
ernment action that affects more than surplus. The boundaries of
this law have not been tested, but at some point government action
that affects our earned entitlement may be held unconstitutional.
For example, the Constitution might not permit a communist
economy in which all our earned entitlement is taken and distrib-
uted by government fiat.
We need not necessarily adopt this narrow view of economic lib-
erties, however, to approve active government. Active government
creates a surplus, and so long as it affects only that surplus, the
government does not compromise efficiency values. Therefore, even
if one finds that the Constitution incorporates efficiency values,
one cannot use that concept against the constitutionality of gov-
ernment action that stays within the surplus. The constitutional
questions then become who we take the surplus from and how we
allocate this surplus. At this point, we move to more subtle and
controversial levels of analysis-those outside the concept of eco-
nomic liberty. To me, however, the Constitution tells us several
things about the taking and allocating of surplus.
For one thing, the Constitution requires that we take or allocate
surplus through a certain type of decisionmaking: a republican
form and due process. Because I hope good government is a funda-
mental constitutional principle, I believe that this is the evolved
[Vol. 31:431
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constitutional concept of economic liberty. Once within the area of
acceptable process and motivation, the debate must center on
whether a particular transfer will enhance future surplus. This is a
political debate within the boundaries of the social contract.
The decisions to take and to allocate surplus may have many
constitutionally acceptable motivations. Some of these decisions
are distributional justice decisions aimed at allocating the surplus
to those who need it most. Decisions about allocating the surplus
are aimed also at enhancing surplus. Some of the surplus goes to
maintaining the cooperative environment and preventing destruc-
tive conduct. Often the justifications for welfare payments, for ex-
ample, include considerations such as preventing crime or limiting
burdens on productive members of society. Transfer of surplus
may involve government intervention that prevents wealth loss
from monopolistic or fraudulent business practices, or transfers
that are in reality joint investments, such as investments in
"human capital"-education, health care, training the handi-
capped-involving a payoff that will accrue to society in the long
run.
Contrary to Epstein, therefore, I do not believe that the scope of
economic liberties necessarily implicates other liberties. Nonethe-
less, the Constitution limits our economic decisions. It tells us that
we cannot take or allocate surplus according to certain prohibited
considerations such as religion or race. A link is not necessarily es-
tablished, however, between economic liberties and other constitu-
tional liberties simply because the latter affect government deci-
sions about taking and allocating surplus.
I admit I have approached this question somewhat differently
than Epstein. I start, not with the private constitutional litigant,
but with the government action. In deciding the constitutionality
of a government action, I would go down the list of potential con-
stitutional rights. I am saying only that economic liberties are not
violated if the government action affects a surplus. The violation of
other liberties may, however, prevent the action.
Economic liberties and the other liberties, however, overlap as
well. Even under a fairly expansive view of economic liberties, the
Constitution prevents only the taking of more than the cooperative
surplus. Where the economic liberty leaves off, however, other lib-
erties may continue. For example, the government cannot take or
1990]
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transfer either surplus or the product of our labor under religious
motivations, whereas economic liberties might protect only the lat-
ter. The Constitution might protect the product of our labor, how-
ever, even if the decisions did not involve religious considerations.
Indeed, religion gives a fairly complete example of this interac-
tion. The first amendment says that government can neither giveth
nor taketh away. Without violating the first amendment, active
government can create surplus that accrues to the benefit of reli-
gion. It maintains roads for people to travel to church, educates
the population so that people can read religious materials, provides
an open society, enforces contracts, and so on. Still, the Constitu-
tion does not allow the government to take back that surplus on
religious grounds. The free exercise clause provides that protec-
tion. Nor does the Constitution allow the government to allocate
other surplus to religion. The establishment clause prohibits that
action also. As long as government stays within the surplus, how-
ever, economic liberties remain irrelevant to the constitutionality
of the government action. The Constitution does not prevent gov-
ernment from affecting surplus in a way that benefits religion,
among other interests.
One of the cases cited by Epstein serves as an example of the
disjunction of economic liberties from the other liberties. In Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,'20 the Supreme Court held that a Con-
necticut statute violated the establishment clause by providing em-
ployees with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their
chosen Sabbath. As Epstein observes, this may be a correct hold-
ing, but the correctness of the holding has nothing to do with eco-
nomic liberties.21
If the Connecticut action infringed only economic liberties, it
should have been held constitutional. Nonreligious employees were
not hurt by the statute because if Sunday workers became scarce,
the nonreligious employees could bid up their wage price. Employ-
ers were not hurt because they were merely required to pay the
true cost of hiring people to work on Sundays. If workers had a
greater taste for working on Wednesday, for example, rather than
Sunday, then hiring Sunday workers should be costlier. Employers
20. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
21. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 406.
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and thereby consumers should pay for indulging their taste for
shopping on Sundays. Neither religious nor nonreligious workers
are hurt; they are simply paying for their taste in days on which to
work. Under an efficiency measure, the Connecticut law does not
fail. It may fail because any law that takes into account a taste or
distaste for religion violates the first amendment, but not because
of the concept of economic liberties.
Of course the problem is: How do we find the boundary of the
surplus created by our joining into a cooperative society?22 Courts
have been very lenient in controlling government action in this re-
gard. I am less worried about this than Epstein is because I see the
work of constitutional interpretation here, as others are apt to see
the work of the common law process in general, with its basis in
sound economic principles.23
This optimistic theory of the evolution of the law is based on a
sort of legal Darwinism: Inefficient laws will not survive over
time.24 A large part of the process behind the emergence of .effi-
cient laws is the tendency for inefficient principles to be challenged
much more often than efficient ones, with the result that inefficient
principles evolve, however slowly, into efficient principles.
Although some doubt exists that the law in general evolves this
way, law directly related to efficiency values surely must. Because
economic liberties focus so intently on efficiency, one would expect
the law regarding these liberties to be particularly sensitive to effi-
ciency values. At the least, one would expect the law to evolve to-
wards, not away from, efficient solutions. I believe this "natural"
process has brought constitutional law regarding economic liberties
to its current point of operating at an efficient level of economic
liberties.2
22. The surplus involves regulation of business, health, safety, and so on, as well as direct
transfer (e.g. welfare payments).
23. R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 229-30.
24. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). But see R.
COOMR & T. ULEN, LAW AND EcoNomics 494 (1988) (expressing some doubt that inefficient
laws are challenged more often); Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980).
25. Other liberties are much less focused on efficiency, even when efficiency is defined as
aggregate total utility, and hence one would expect a different evolutionary pattern. The
efficiency basis for economic liberties, appropriately absent with regard to other liberties,
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This concept of legal Darwinism suggests that our economy has
not been living with 50-year-old inefficient constitutional princi-
ples. Instead constitutional law concerning economic liberties may
have evolved to its optimal point fifty years ago.26 True, this law
developed a very narrow view of economic liberties, but because
economic liberties focus so intently on efficiency values and other
liberties do not, one should not find surprising the fact that the
different liberties have evolved in different ways.
Arguments for the acceptance of limited economic liberties are
not arguments for blind acceptance of all the current surplus-seek-
ing or allocating government activities. The advisability of such
programs should be constantly evaluated. Over time, good ideas
fail to prove themselves in practice, and circumstances change so
that an idea for one time is not appropriate for another. A truly
liberal public policy approach has the flexibility to adjust or dis-
card concepts and to develop new ideas while remaining commit-
ted to humane goals. This need for flexibility itself, however, ar-
gues against an expansive interpretation of economic liberties.
CONCLUSION
An open minded survey of Epstein's writings makes difficult a
challenge based on his goals. What is suggested here, instead, is
that he has ignored an important mechanism in our economic sys-
tem. Active government is necessary to create the cooperative sur-
plus on which we all thrive. Because man lacks the altruistic in-
stincts of bees and ants, we can only achieve the cooperative
surplus by accepting compelled cooperation. In a complicated soci-
ety, government necessarily performs this function.
The debate, then, should not center on constitutional principles,
but on the advisability of particular efforts to take, allocate, or
generate cooperative surplus. Constitutional principles that protect
economic liberties only in extreme situations seem optimum.
Nonetheless, I do not contend that Epstein and others cannot find
has naturally created the separation Epstein sees between the protection of economic liber-
ties and that of other liberties, in this case those relating to religion.
26. Imagine, for example, a pareto optimal state in which no one can be made better off
by correcting the law about economic liberties without making someone else worse off.
[Vol. 31:431
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a superior economic state; I assert only that they have to look else-
where than the Constitution.
